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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature on business failure by investigating the relationship 
between terrorism and country-level global business failure by using a sample of 174 
countries over the period 2009–2015. To proxy for business failure, the ‘Resolving 
Insolvency’ index, which is a component of the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ index, was 
adapted and used. The results of the fixed-effects estimation show that terrorism has a 
positive and significant relationship with business failure for the full sample. When the 
sample is divided into developed, developing and fragile states, the results show that 
terrorism is positively and significantly related with business failure in developing and fragile 
states only. Estimates show that for every 100 terrorist incidents, business failure increases by 
1% and 0.7% points, in South Asia and Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, respectively. 
The findings contribute to our understanding of the effects of terrorism on business failure, 
and how this differs depending on whether the country is developing, developed, or is a 
fragile state.  
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1.  Introduction 
Terrorism is a new global business threat that has become a major challenge to the 
conduct and survival of global business (Jain & Grosse 2009). Terrorism assumes many 
forms making it very difficult to predict its occurrence and impact (Enderwick 2006; 
Shrivastava 2005). Its impact on global business has been the focus of several recent 
theoretical and empirical research papers (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2008; Bader & Berg 2013; 
Enderwick 2001; Jain & Grosse 2009). Collectively, the evidence from these studies 
suggests, that beyond the loss of life, personal injuries and fear that the terrorists seek to 
create, terrorism has real multiple economic consequences, which are detrimental to the 
survival of international businesses (Kollias et al. 2011). This paper investigates the impact of 
terrorism on country-level global business failure, and also determines whether there are 
differences in its effects on business failure in developed, developing, and fragile countries.  
Our motivation, which is to focus on the effect of terrorism on global business failure, 
is rooted in normative disagreements regarding the impact of terrorism on global businesses, 
and on a dearth of empirical evidence on whether terrorism causes business failure around the 
world. The major normative argument for expecting terrorism to lead to business failure is 
that it will increase costs for the businesses that cannot be met from the revenue stream. For 
example, some of the research have suggested that following a terrorist attack, and where 
there is a need for structural repairs (Enderwick 2001; Ghemawat 2003; Suder 2004), that 
employees will be unwilling to work during the night or at the weekends, thereby, increasing 
the costs for business (Brodeur 2017; Enderwick 2001). Also, it has been suggested that 
safety concerns in terrorism-affected countries often generate stress for expatriate staff, 
leaving them in a state where they are unable to perform their work to satisfactory levels 
(Bader & Schuster 2015; Oetzel & Getz 2012), which might affect the profitability of the 
business, and may lead to business failure. Further, the literature contests that a terrorist 
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attack often leads to business failure beyond the businesses or industries targeted. These 
effects include increased interruptions to supply chains, and to new government regulations 
and procedures, which are intended to reduce stem emergent threats (Bouchet 2004; Ketata & 
McIntyre, 2008; Spich & Grosse 2005).  
The literature also suggests that the effects of terrorism are confined to a few 
businesses, and therefore, should not affect those businesses that are not directly affected by 
the incident. For example, Enderwick (2001) suggests that the airline and tourism industries 
were the main primary sectors affected following the September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter) 
attack in the United States (US). Further, some have also suggested that terrorism should not 
lead to business failure because businesses will quickly recover following an attack. For 
example, following 9/11, the US GDP dropped by only half a percentage point, while the 
stock market recovered all of its losses within a month (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Becker 
& Murphy, 2001). A study by Aslam and Kang (2015) found that the effect of a terrorist 
attack on the Pakistani stock market was short-lived, as the market recovered from the 
terrorist shock in just one day. The findings by Brounrn and Derwell (2010) and Nikkinen et 
al. (2008) also point to financial markets recovering quickly following an attack.  
Further arguments about why terrorism should not result in business failure are 
centred on the assertion that multinational companies can manage terrorism risks to avoid 
business failure (Enderwick 2006; Oetzel & Getz 2012), and through the knowledge 
development derived from such incidents, they can actually gain a competitive advantage. 
According to Gao et al. (2017), a business can manage the effects of terrorism by using their 
reputation as one of their many intangible assets, which can facilitate their long-run survival 
needs. It has also been suggested that multinational corporations (MNCs) can improve their 
chances of survival through the knowledge that they have acquired as a result of the terrorism 
threat (Petersen et al. 2008). Similarly, Suder et al. (2017a) find that HR practices, and the 
4 | P a g e  
 
interventions adopted in hostile environments, play a critical role in leveraging the lessons 
learnt from addressing the terrorist threat; therefore, improving the resilience and efficiency 
of systems in other parts of the business that are unaffected, directly, by terrorism.  
The paper also investigates whether terrorism has a different effect on business failure 
depending on whether the country is developed, developing, or fragile. This is for several 
reasons. First, there is anecdotal evidence that terrorism has different economic consequences 
in developed and developing countries – hence the suspicion that this may extend to business 
failure. For instance, the evidence by Cinar (2017) suggests that terrorism negatively affects 
economic growth particularly in low-income countries. The finding by Procasky and Ujah 
(2016), which is that terrorism results in a higher cost of debt, particularly, for developing 
markets, also suggests that there is a differential impact of terrorism on developed and 
developing countries. Second, the differences in resources between developed and developing 
countries are important, as the former have more resources that can cushion the effect of 
terrorism, such as applying monetary, fiscal and other policies to speed up the recovery from 
either a large-scale attack or a prolonged attack (Sandler & Enders 2008). For example, the 
US Congress approved the introduction of an emergence insurance to cover the catastrophic 
losses that were experienced due to the effects of terrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attack 
(Kunreuther at al. 2003), which meant that some business failures were avoided.  
Finally, terrorism may lead to more business failures in developing and fragile states, 
when compared to the cases in developed countries; this is because of the pervasiveness of 
‘institutional voids’ (Khanna & Palepu 1997, 2005). This means that the institutional 
arrangements needed to support the normal functioning of the market are absent, weak, or fail 
to accomplish the role expected of them (Mair & Marti 2009). This often results in the higher 
cost of doing business. Most fragile states are also characterised by a sustained degradation of 
the preconditions that are relevant for markets to exist, such as governance structure, rules of 
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exchange (Fligstein 2001) and autonomy (McMillan 2002), as well as lacking the institutions 
needed for the market to function well (e.g., governance mechanisms, disclosure 
requirements, and functioning judiciary) (Rotberg 2003). We argue that the combination of a 
high security risk and severe institutional voids, where businesses are learning to adapt to 
dangerous and high-risk environments whilst operating and protecting staff and assets, makes 
fragile states an extreme business environment to operate in.  
Panel data from 174 countries over the period 2009–2015 were used to achieve our 
objectives. The sample was then divided into 40 developed, 134 developing, and 39 fragile 
countries 5 . To capture business failure, we adapted and used the World Bank’s Doing 
Business’ Resolving Insolvency index as a proxy. The results of the fixed-effects estimations 
show that terrorism has a significant positive impact on business failure. However, when the 
sample is divided into developed, developing and fragile countries, the results indicate that 
terrorism has a significant positive impact on business failure in developing and fragile 
countries, but not in developed countries. The marginal effects of the interactions with 
regional dummies of the fragile countries show that an increase in terrorist incidents by 100 
will increase business failure by 1% and 0.7% points in the South Asia and SSA regions, 
respectively.  
The study makes two main contributions to the literature on the impact of terrorism on 
economic outcomes. First, the study contributes by improving our understanding of the 
relationship between terrorism and business failure. This is significant given that, despite 
normative arguments suggesting a positive relationship (e.g., Enderwick 2001; Brodeur 2017) 
and no relationship (Aslam & Kang 2015; Brounrn & Derwell 2010; Enderwick 2001), there 
is no empirical evidence on whether terrorism leads to business failure. Second, the study 
also contributes by providing evidence that terrorism has a positive effect on business failure 
                                                 
5 Note that there are overlaps in developing and fragile countries. That is, the sample of fragile countries also 
makes up the sample of developing countries.  
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– but only in developing and fragile countries. The current finding of this study follows on 
from the limited evidence found in the literature (e.g., Blomberg et al. 2004; Cinar 2017) that 
shows that terrorism affects economic growth differently in developed countries when they 
are compared to developing countries.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
terrorism and business failure. In Section 3, the data are defined, and the models outlined. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results followed by a discussion. The summary and 
conclusions are in Section 5. 
 
2.    Literature Review  
2.1 Why terrorism should lead to business failure 
Terrorism has direct and indirect effects on the performance of businesses, which may 
lead to their failure. For example, the direct effect of terrorism is the immediate effect 
experienced by individual businesses during a terror attack (Greenbaum et al. 2007; Knight & 
Czinkota 2008; Suder 2004). This includes the immediate loss of lives and property, cost of 
rescue and rebuilding, and additional resources to prevent future terrorist attacks (Greenbaum 
et al. 2007; Lenain et al. 2002; Mueller & Stewart 2014). Terrorism not only affects the 
physical destruction of a global business, but also indirectly alters the rank and value of 
global brands. By linking the threat of terrorism to the rank and value of 100 global brands 
after the 9/11 attack, Suder et al. (2008) find a significant moderation in the rank and value 
of global brands in the first five years after the 9/11 attack. Jain and Grosse (2009) contend 
that the overall psychological effect of the risk of a future terror attack, and the direct cost of 
increased airport security, have an adverse economic consequence on global business 
transactions. Other costs (including security and surveillance expenditure, delay in issuing 
visas, repairs, and replacement of stolen property) adversely deplete the financial resources of 
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fragile states (Rotberg 2003), which may cause business failure. It is estimated that the 9/11 
attacks cost US companies US$30.7 billion in lost revenue just from the delaying of issuing 
visas to visitors, and to foreign business personnel travelling to the United States.  
According to Jain and Grosse (2009), the increased uncertainty and risk relating to 
terrorism also create an unpredictable disruption in the supply- and value-chain operations, 
resulting in a slowing or shutting down of production lines, loss of revenue due to stock-outs, 
and higher insurance and transportation costs for a more expedient shipment among 
businesses. Businesses under such conditions rely more on firm strategy than on traditional 
risk management strategy to manage such a supply- and value-chain disruption so as to avoid 
any failure (Enderwick 2006). According to Wernick (2006), terrorism risk hurts the 
operation of multinational businesses or value-chain partners due to the disruptions it brings 
to the flow of resources (moving goods, money, people and information), leading to increased 
cost, time delay and missed opportunities.   
The effects of terrorism have also been found to include the willingness of employees 
to work at certain times or on certain days of the week (Brodeur 2017; Greenbaum et al. 
2007). For example, several studies (e.g., Warr, 2000; Wilcox et al. 2003) contend that the 
fear of violence could also cause changes in the routine activities of workers, and this change 
in behaviour translates into a greater cost to the business. According to Hamermesh (1999), 
the fear of crime reduces the willingness of employees to work at the weekends and during 
the evenings. As a result, businesses are more likely to offer higher wages to entice staff to 
work during these periods. Dreher et al. (2011) state that the fear and uncertainty in the 
aftermath of a terrorist attack also affects the individual migration decisions of skilled 
workers. This outcome is reinforced by the potential host countries who are increasingly 
resorting to quality-selective immigration policies, and prefer skilled over medium- and low-
skilled immigrants (e.g., Docquier et al. 2007), making it relatively easy for just the skilled 
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workers to leave their terror-ridden home countries for safer locations. Such conditions may 
lead to business failures due to the decline in human capital, which is needed to sustain the 
firm's operations  (Amankwah-Amoah 2016; D’Aveni & MacMillan 1990; Hambrick & 
D’Aveni 1992).   
In addition, operating in a terror-endangered area has a tremendously negative effect 
on the organisational commitment of the workforce (Reade & Lee 2012). Overall, evidence 
suggests that global relocation involves many changes and stressful challenges and often 
exposes expatriates to various level of stress (Harrison et al. 2004; Shaffer & Harrison 1998). 
Some of these challenges include learning a new language, adapting to different cultural 
norms, and establishing new social networks (Caligiuri, 1997; Selmer 2001). These 
challenges are multiplied by safety concerns that are linked to living in terrorism-endangered 
countries. Because there is often only limited support for those who relocate, this can lead to 
uncertainty and stress for expatriates, and affect the psychological wellbeing of those who are 
working in terrorism-endangered countries (Bader & Schuster 2015; Oetzel & Getz 2012). 
The post-traumatic stress, anxiety and feelings of insecurity result in the failure of most 
managers, who are assigned to terror-endangered countries, to be able to complete their tasks, 
or they underperform. For instance, Bader and Schuster (2015) analyse the impact of 
expatriate social networks on the psychological wellbeing of 175 expatriates working in four 
terrorism-endangered countries (Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia). The 
evidence suggests that a large and diversified network positively affects the psychological 
wellbeing of international expatriates operating in these four regions that are exposed to 
terrorism. Similarly, Bader and Berg (2013) investigate how terror-induced stress affects the 
attitude and performance of 143 expatriate managers in high-risk countries. The evidence 
suggests that terror-induced stress lowers the expatriates’ work attitude and their attitude 
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towards their host country nationals (disaffection). This eventually impedes their 
performance and may lead to business failure. 
It has, however, been suggested that terrorist attacks only affect a few businesses, and 
therefore, should not be considered responsible for all business failures. For instance, 
following the 9/11 attack in New York, USA, Enderwick (2001) identified that only the 
airline and tourism sectors were most affected by it. According to Enderwick the attack had 
an immediate impact on the propensity for, and the cost of, airline travel, given that the 
terrorists had utilised commercial aircrafts to carry out the attack, which then hurt the tourism 
sector. The higher level of uncertainty resulted in higher security costs and delays, which by 
implication had a differential adverse effect on the productivity of short-haul carriers and the 
growth of the tourism sector. For instance, in anticipation of the drop in orders following the 
9/11 attack, Boeing and other major airlines announced layoffs of between 20,000 and 30,000 
staff, while others such as Air Canada, which depended heavily on the US market, grounded 
several planes.  
Although, a terrorist attack directly affects only a few businesses, some have 
suggested that it can lead to business failure beyond the businesses that are attacked, because 
the indirect effects of terrorism have a tendency to be widely felt. These effects include a 
decline in buyer demand, increased inter-business transaction costs, interruptions in 
international supply chains, decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), and the imposition of 
new government regulations and procedures intended to manage emergent threats (Barth et 
al. 2006; Bouchet 2004; Czinkota et al. 2004; Lenain et al. 2002; Spich & Grosse 2005). For 
instance, the fear of terrorism heightens the level of uncertainty in the market, which 
adversely affects consumer behaviour and the businesses’ investment decisions (Becker & 
Rubinstein 2004; Drakos 2010). 
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Becker and Rubinstein (2004) argue that the fear of terrorism heightens the level of 
uncertainty in the market, which in turn adversely affects consumer behaviour and investment 
decisions. According to Sandler and Enders (2008) the immediate cost of terrorism is 
localised, resulting in a substitution of economic activities from relatively vulnerable sectors 
to relatively safer sectors. This substitution allows large diversified businesses to cushion 
their losses. In an open economy, the intensity of terrorism is likely to force the large 
movement of international investments to avoid other types of risk (Enderwick 2006). A 
portion of such expensive investment is again used to support anti-terrorism measures raising, 
further, the costs of capital and the transactional costs of doing business.  
The substitution argument is supported by the results from several studies (e.g., 
Abadie & Gardeazabal 2008; Abadie & Dermsi 2008; Suder & Czinkota 2007). For example, 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) find that the increased level of uncertainty associated with 
terrorism causes a large movement of international capital across countries in an attempt by 
international investors to avoid other types of countries’ risk. This eventually results in low 
levels of return on investment due to the lack of productive capital to support business 
operations. Following 9/11, Suder and Czinkota (2007) find a significant increase in the 
migration of investment to less risky countries with a more expensive capital requirement for 
investment in risky countries. Similarly, Abadie and Dermsi (2008) suggest that vacancy 
rates, in the three most distinctive landmark buildings in Chicago and their vicinities, 
increased, when compared to other areas post 9/11, which suggested that economic activity in 
the Central Business Districts can be greatly affected by any changes, perceived, concerning 
the level of terrorism.   
According to Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009), transnational terrorism has growth-
limiting effects on terror-prone countries. This may lead to more business failures in such 
countries as it reduces growth by crowding-in government expenditures. Lenain et al. (2002) 
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contend that, during periods of terror attacks, resources devoted to improving security in both 
the public and private sectors may crowd-out more productive spending, thus raising the cost 
of capital and labour. Such adverse business conditions increase the likelihood of business 
failures, both in the short run and in the long run (Liu 2009).  
 
2.2 Why terrorism should not lead to business failure 
Despite most evidence suggesting that terrorism may lead to business failure, some 
have suggested that it should not have much impact, since businesses quickly recover after 
the attack. For example, some have stated that a terrorist attack destroys only a small fraction 
of the stock of capital of a country (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2008; Becker & Murphy 2001). 
For example, after 9/11, the US GDP dropped by only half a percentage point, while the 
stock market recovered all its losses within a month. Similarly, after the Paris attack in 2015, 
the CAC-40 closed just 0.1% lower on the day. Also, after the London attack in 2005, the 
markets bounced back within days. Consistent with this notion, Aslam and Kang (2015) find 
that although terrorist attacks hurt the Pakistani stock market, such an effect was only short-
lived as the market recovered from the terrorist shock in one day. They also find evidence 
that the impact of the terrorist attack depends on the location and type of attack, with more 
severe attacks eliciting a more negative response from the Karachi Stock Exchange. 
Similarly, Brounrn and Derwell (2010) and Nikkinen et al. (2008) report that financial 
markets react strongly to terror events, but then recover swiftly and soon return to business as 
usual, depending on the sector. 
Arif and Suleman (2017) find mixed positive and negative impacts of terrorism on the 
stock prices of different sectors on the Karachi Stock Exchange. Further, the fear of 
uncertainty under such conditions most likely creates a beneficial environmental jolt for 
businesses  to thrive (Carter & Auken 2006). For example,  Zycher (2003) finds that, after the 
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9/11 attack, there was a significant increase in demand for security- and technology-related 
businesses, whilst tourism-related businesses experienced a decline in demand. Drakos and 
Kutan (2003) also find a similar drop in demand for tourism in those Mediterranean countries 
that had experienced terror attacks, and a significant rise in those destinations that were 
deemed safer. Also, in another tourism-based study, Araña & León (2008) report that the 
9/11 attacks caused a shock to tourists’ utility and that some destinations experienced a 
strongly negative impact on their image and attractiveness, while others upgraded due to the 
effects of the terrorism. Arin et al. (2008) provide evidence on the response to terror shocks 
by the stock markets of six countries (Indonesia, Israel, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the UK). 
Their study findings show that terror has a significant impact on both stock markets and stock 
market volatility, and the magnitude of these effects is larger in emerging markets. 
Specifically, they found the impact on both stock markets and stock market volatility in Spain 
and the UK to be generally less affected by terror shocks, which suggests that the financial 
investors in these two countries are more resilient to these events. This result can be 
explained by the investors' awareness of the higher institutional quality in Western 
democracies, and implies that relevant authorities might absorb the shocks caused by terrorist 
attacks to the financial markets, as suggested by Johnston and Nedelescu (2006). 
According to the resource-based view (RBV) theory of the firm, a business can avoid 
failure, even if it is affected by terrorism, by developing distinct resources and hard-to-
imitate, rare, and valuable capabilities which will increase its survival probability, and which 
drives superior performance by generating a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 
1991). Any failure in any of these resources and capabilities adversely affects the 
organisation (Mellahi & Wilkinson 2010). Knight et al. (2008) argue that businesses with 
better resources are in a good position to, and more likely to, respond to terrorism. In his 
integrative process model of organisational failure, he identified an array of external factors 
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and internal factors precipitating organisational failure. According to Amankwah-Amoah 
(2016), these external factors are industry-specific and environmental factors, which the 
businesses  have less control over. Terrorism can result in external environmental jolts, which 
are difficult to foresee, but these can cause a significant disruption to business and also 
potential business failure. Tirole (1988) contends that businesses, which cannot fit in with the 
demands of their environment, are often either “selected out” or “die”. Therefore, the effect 
of terrorism on business failure may depend on the resources available to each business. 
Specifically, those with more resources are likely to survive the effects of a terrorist attack, 
while those with fewer resources are likely to fail. 
The other argument for suggesting that terrorism should not lead to business failure is 
that businesses will try to manage the effects of terrorism. For instance, Harvey (1993) finds 
that fewer than 50% of MNCs had a formal programme to deal with terror attacks. However, 
a survey by Pricewaterhouse Coopers (2004) identified that 30% of global CEOs recognised 
terrorism as one of the biggest threats facing their organisations. This means that businesses 
consider that proactively responding to violent conflict is strategically important for their 
performance and legitimacy (Kolk & Lenfant 2010; Oetzel & Getz 2012) and to avoid 
business failure (Enderwick 2001, 2006; Kolk & Lenfant 2016; Oetzel & Getz 2012; 
Shrivastava 2005).  
In his work on managing the new global threats, Enderwick (2006) emphasises the 
need for businesses to focus more on strategy than on the traditional risk management 
approaches of managing new global threats. These key strategic responses include supply 
chain management, diversification and scenario planning, and ensuring business continuity. 
Shrivastava (2005) presented a crisis management framework for understanding the 
organisational and social processes, and causes and consequences of terrorism. Shrivastava 
(2005) suggests that having such an expanded view of terrorism affords policy makers in 
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government and private organisations a better opportunity of identifying preventive measures 
to reduce the impact of terrorism on businesses and economic activities.  On the question of 
why and how businesses respond to violent conflicts, Oetzel and Getz (2012) suggest that the 
proximity of stakeholders affects the strategy that businesses are likely to adopt in response to 
a conflict. The authors find that; whereas, local stakeholder pressure is associated with the 
likelihood that businesses will respond directly to violent conflict, and also collaborate with 
other organisation(s) or work alone, international stakeholders will respond indirectly to 
conflicts.   
There has also been a suggestion that businesses can alleviate the effects of terrorism 
by using their reputation as one of many intangible assets, which can facilitate its long-run 
survival needs (Gao et al. 2017). Favourable reputation can help a firm realise the potential of 
its resources, therefore, enhancing its ability to attract and retain strategic human capital 
(Turban & Cable 2003), as well as lowering its cost of capital, increasing its ability to raise 
financing (Stuart at al. 1999), increasing its ability to choose high-quality partners (Dollinger 
et al. 1997) and form alliances (Stern et al. 2014), and helping mitigate the impact of negative 
events (Love & Kraatz, 2009). According to Gao et al. (2017), businesses can explore their 
reputation through their brands to gain a competitive advantage in emerging markets and to 
overcome institutional voids to assure long-run survival. To assess this reputation, buyers 
“tend to use brand names as signals of quality and value and often gravitate to products with 
brand names they have come to associate with quality and value” (Herbig & Milewicz 1995: 
8). Brands can also induce economies of scale in generating and spreading reputation; for 
example, a firm with a favourable reputation due to its high-quality performance in one 
product can transfer that positive reputation to another product via its brand name (Moorthy 
1985).  
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Several prior studies have also explored how the MNCs operating in failed states can 
improve their chances of survival from a HRM perspective (Czinkota et al. 2010; Suder 
2006; Suder et al. 2017a, 2017b).  Knowledge development through the internationalisation 
of foreign markets has been recognised by prior studies as a prerequisite for market 
expansion, competitive advantage, and increased resource commitment, which are relevant 
for the long-run survival needs of these businesses (see Johanson and Vahlue (1997) and 
Petersen et al. (2008)). Recently, Suder et al. (2017a) adopt an in-depth case study approach 
to provide an understanding of the role of ‘rare’ knowledge and the mechanisms that link the 
knowledge paths of MNCs operating in failed states. The key findings of the study suggest 
that HR practices and interventions adopted within hostile environments, with the expatriates’ 
willingness to learn and share new knowledge, play a critical role in the creation, capturing 
and leveraging of rare knowledge used by MNCs for their long-run survival needs. Firing et 
al. (2015) also highlight potential ways through which businesses can capture and leverage 
knowledge classified as ‘rare’ through HR interventions, such as debriefing, so more can be 
learned from experiences gained during extreme events. Given that there are reasons for 
expecting terrorism to either lead or not to lead to business failure, we formulate the 
alternative hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between terrorism and business 
failure. It is, therefore, hypothesised that: 
H1: Terrorism is positively associated with global business failure 
H1a: Terrorism is positively associated with business failure in developed countries 
H1b: Terrorism is positively associated with business failure in developing countries 
H1c: Terrorism is positively associated with business failure in fragile countries 
 
2.2.3 How the effect of terrorism may differ due to institutional voids 
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Although, we have discussed why terrorism might lead to business failure, the effect 
of terrorism may not be the same for all countries because of institutional voids. For example, 
it is well documented that MNCs operating in terrorism-endangered countries, such as failed 
states, are often faced with pervasive institutional voids (Gao et al. 2017; Khanna & Palepu 
1997, 2005). Most fragile states are often perceived to be riskier due to their pervasive 
inability to control their own national borders, or project power throughout their national 
territory, and they continually face the threat of secession, civil war, and large-scale violent 
internal struggles for control between the government and one or more non-state actors 
(Rotberg 2003). These countries also lack institutions that can help facilitate market 
transactions (Khanna & Palepu 2010). For example, banks cannot always assure credit to 
businesses; and the absence of a rule of law means that courts cannot guarantee the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (Gao et al. 2017).  
Since institutional voids are more likely to occur in developing and fragile countries 
than in developed countries, it is possible that the impact of terrorism on global business 
failure may differ. This is based on the reasoning that developed countries have recovered 
quickly from the effects of terrorism, when compared to developing and fragile countries, due 
to differences in resources. However, despite such reasoning, there is no empirical evidence 
on whether terrorism has a different effect on business failure in developed, developing, and 
fragile countries where terrorism incidents are ongoing. Therefore, this paper adds to the 
existing literature by providing the evidence of how terrorism affects global business failure 
in developed, developing and fragile countries. Based on the on-going evidence, we develop 
the following hypotheses: 
H2: The impact of terrorism on business failure is more in developing and fragile countries 
due to prevalent institutional voids  
 
3.  Sample Construction and Empirical Methods 
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3.1 Sample construction 
      There are 195 countries in the world, which consist of 193 countries that are 
member states of the United Nations and 2 countries that are non-member observer states.  
However, being constrained by the unavailability of some of the countries’ data we employ a 
panel of 174 countries and independent territories for the period 2009 to 2015. This is 
because comprehensive data for the World Bank’s Doing Business’ resolving insolvency 
index, which we adapt and use as a proxy for global business failure, was not available prior 
to 2009.  
The sample of countries was further partitioned into developed, developing, and 
fragile countries. The fragile countries were systematically chosen because they are ranked 
high in the failed states index6 as well as being terror-prone. For example, although countries 
such as Zimbabwe, North Korea and others are ranked high on the failed index, they are, 
however, not terror-prone. Similarly, the UK, France, and others, which are terror-prone, are 
not ranked high in the failed states index. Finally, fragile countries’ regional dummies for 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia and the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) 
were interacted7 with the terrorism to investigate the marginal differences of the impact of 
these variables on business failure in these regional sub-samples. These regions (SSA, South 
Asia and MENA) are the most terror-prone in the top-ranked category of the fragile states 
index (Okafor & Piesse 2017). The countries in these regions also contribute to a very 
significant share of terrorist incidents. The data used were sourced from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) and World Bank Development Indicators (WBDI). In addition, all variables 
were winsorised at the 1% level  (Rahaman 2011)  to reduce the influence of outliers. The 
sample of countries employed in the data is shown in Table 1A and Table 1B.  
                                                 
6 See the FSI (2017) report for fragile states ranking.  
7 An interaction is formed as a product of two (or more) variables. An important application of the interaction 
variables is that it allows for differences in the slopes of two regression lines. For further reading, see Dielman 
(2005). 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2 Variable description 
3.2.1 Dependent variable  
    The main variable of interest is a country-level business failure. Following the prior 
evidence of Shepherd et al. (2000, 2009), business failure occurs when a fall in revenues 
and/or a rise in expenses are of such a magnitude that the firm becomes insolvent and cannot 
attract new debt or equity funding; it cannot continue to operate under the current ownership 
and management conditions. However, due to the unavailability of firm-level data on 
business failure, in most of the developing and fragile countries, we adapted and used the 
resolving insolvency index obtained from the World Bank Doing Business database. 
According to the methodology used by the Word Bank, countries that obtain a higher score 
on the index (expressed as a percentage) have high recovery rates by secured creditors 
through reorganisation, liquidation or debt enforcement proceedings, and are more likely to 
have businesses operating in those countries that are able to survive when compared to those 
countries that have lower scores. Given that our study is more interested in business failure 
than in survival, we adapted this index, so that it can be interpreted on the basis of the 
chances of business failure rather than survival. We achieved this by subtracting the resolving 
index percentage from 100 for each country. By so doing, we ended up with an index, which 
is an inverse of the World Bank Doing Business resolving insolvency. According to this 
adapted index, businesses that operate in countries that have a higher index score are more 
likely to fail.  
The World Bank Doing Business’ resolving insolvency index was adapted and used as 
a proxy for business failure for the following reasons. First, when businesses fail, they 
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become insolvent (Thomson, 1991). Thus, countries with weak insolvency resolving laws 
cannot stimulate the reorganisation of businesses, thereby, leading to business failures 
(Dewaelheyns & Van Hulle 2008). Second, weak resolving insolvency laws cannot save 
struggling businesses when it is possible to do so, or reallocate the insolvent resources of 
failing businesses more productively. This is because investors and entrepreneurs will be less 
willing to commit to productive activities when they know they might be putting their entire 
personal fortunes in jeopardy (Cirmizi et al. 2011). For example, if it was not for the effective 
and robust insolvency resolving framework in Japan, then some of their struggling banks 
would not have been reorganised or absorbed by the stronger banks (Imai, 2009; Hoshi, 
2002). Third, a weak resolving insolvency framework increases the cost of capital and is not 
able to mitigate against the weak mechanisms that are often responsible for business failures. 
Finally, a weak resolving insolvency framework cannot allow for a systematic approach that 
reduces ineffective debt recovery processes, thus weakening the investment climate (World 
Bank 2017). 
 
3.2.1 Independent variable  
    Our main independent variable is terrorism, which is measured by the number of 
terrorist incidents, as defined in Table 2, together with the dependent and control variables. 
Similar to the study by Greenbaum et al. (2007), our study adopts the US military definition 
of terrorism, namely, “the threat or actual use of illegal force or violence to attain a political, 
economic religious or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation” (LaFree and 
Dugan, 2002, p. 16). The US military definition of terrorism is one of the broadest of the 
definitions used in the creation of open source databases, and is including threats as well as 
actual violence, and social, religious and economic motives as well as political ones. 
Businesses in fragile and terror-prone countries face a significant number of terror threats and 
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actual violence for a range of social, political and economic reasons. These threats and 
incidents of violence result in both direct and indirect costs, which hurt business growth and 
survival (see Greenbaum et al. (2007), Knight & Czinkota (2008), Lenain et al. (2002) and 
Mueller and Stewart (2014)).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
3.2.2 Control variables  
    The study also controls for several variables that impact business failure. These 
variables are mainly a proxy for financial development. According to the available literature, 
financial development has positive implications for an economy’s long-run level of real 
activity (Boyd et al. 2001). Financial development comes with better economies of scale, 
increased supervision and regulation, and sustainable competition. These, we argue, mitigate 
against the survival and growth of businesses, since there will be higher levels of GDP, 
higher levels of savings, lower levels of inflation, efficient lending rates, and greater 
availability of credit within that economy. Banks and other lending institutions often create 
loans from savings. This means that business is less likely to be credit-constrained in the 
countries that have better economic growth rates, and where there is the availability of 
savings and credit. According to Detragiache et al. (2008), studies have shown that 
businesses benefited, immensely, in terms of profit through an increase in loan size. Tsoukas 
(2011) also shows that financial development played an important role in firm survival. That 
is, more liquid markets improved the survival chances of businesses. In contrast, inflation and 
high lending rates can erode the profit and increase the cost of doing business, respectively. 
The latter can also imply that businesses find it difficult to access credit, thus experiencing a 
fall in competitiveness, cost efficiency, and survival rates. 
 
3.3 Preliminary data analysis 
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    Tables 3A and 3B show the descriptive statistics of the variables used. On 
average, 56.32% of the businesses in a particular country are likely to fail. The minimum is at 
about the 0.14% point (which is Japan in 2013), while the maximum is at about the 99.95% 
point (which is Zimbabwe in 2009 and 2010). The results also show a big difference in the 
average percentage of businesses likely to fail between developed countries (30.80%) and 
developing countries (65.22%). The results of the fragile countries’ sub-sample in Table 3B 
show that, on average, 66.54% of the businesses are likely to fail, and the figure is slightly 
higher than that of the developing countries. The minimum for the fragile countries is 22.32% 
(Colombia in 2012) and the maximum is 96.61% (Rwanda in 2013). Furthermore, the 
descriptive statistics show that at the mean, MENA (65.89% point) and South Asia (64.31% 
point) have a slightly lower business failure rate when compared to SSA (71.14% point).  
[INSERT TABLE 3A & 3B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Regarding the terrorism incidents, about 53 terrorist incidents were recorded over the 
period under review in the overall sample of countries. If disaggregated into developed, 
developing and fragile countries, the average numbers of terrorist incidents for the period are 
about 8, 71 and 218, respectively. For the fragile countries, of the three regions8 studied, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) has the lowest number of terrorism incidents at 43, South Asia and 
Middle East has the highest number at 572, and North Africa (MENA), on average, recorded 
312 incidents.  
    The correlation coefficients are in Tables 4A and 4B. The coefficients of the 
independent variable do not suggest that there would be problems of multicollinearity in our 
study. In contrast to expectations, terrorism has a weak association with our measure of 
business failure, both in the global and fragile country samples. The control variables 
                                                 
8 World regional classifications according to the World Bank are as follows; East Asia and Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America & the Caribbean, MENA, North America, South Asia, and SSA.  
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suggested a moderate association with our measure of business failure, although, and since 
correlation is not causality, the magnitude of these coefficients will have limited implications 
in our regression analysis.  
 
 [INSERT TABLE 4A & 4 B ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Empirical Approach 
     4.1 The baseline specification and method 
    The analysis was estimated using the fixed-effects technique, as this was the most 
preferred by the Hausman test 9  as against the Random-effects technique. The estimated 
technique employed in this study has advantages. First, the fixed-effects can help eliminate 
the risk of biased estimates because of heterogeneity across countries. Second, the fixed-
effects can allow for constant slope coefficients, but with different intercepts for the 
individual countries. Third, the cross-section and the time dimensions of the data add more 
explanatory power to the estimation by allowing for higher degrees of freedom (Baltagi 1995; 
Gujarati 2004). The fixed-effects model can be estimated as follows, 
,                (1) 
where  is business failure in country  at time .  is a matrix of independent and control 
variables and β are the coefficients to be estimated.  and  represent the disturbance term 
– country-specific effects and random errors distributed. An expanded version of equation (1) 
is expressed as 
 (2). 
                                                 
9  Hausman is a general test for specification of an econometric model that is applied to test for the 
appropriateness between the random and the fixed-effects models (Nerlove 2005).   
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    The model was first estimated for the entire sample. Disaggregating the sample into 
developed, developing, and fragile countries followed this. Finally, regional (SSA, South 
Asia and MENA) dummies were interacted with terrorism in order to observe differences in 
the marginal effects across these regional sub-samples. The inclusion of the regional 
dummies of SSA, South Asia and MENA is due to countries in these regions being the most 
terror-prone in the top ranked category of the fragile states index (Okafor & Piesse 2017). 
Also, according to the sample data, these countries contribute a very significant share of 
terrorist incidents.  
    Regarding other specification tests, a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for 
heteroskedasticity indicated no presence of heteroskedasticity and, therefore, robust standard 
errors were not used to relax the assumptions that the errors were both independent and 
identically distributed. The period of the panel data is short; hence, a unit root test and co-
integration are not suitable. These tests are best suited for time-series studies. The GMM 
estimates across the estimations were not consistent due to the inefficiency of estimates and 
the instruments (Baltagi 2013). Therefore, the fixed-effects test assumes the most consistent 
results, and our results and discussions are based on its estimates.  
     
     4.2 Empirical evidence 
    The main results of the relationship between terrorism and country-level global 
business failure are shown in Table 5. The results of all of the countries in our sample in 
Table 5 (Model 1) show that the model explains 45.37% of the variation in business failure. 
The results, which show a positive and significant relationship between terrorism and 
business failure, mean that hypothesis H1 of the study is supported, and is consistent with the 
arguments and on-going evidence of the impact of terrorism on business failure. The result 
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suggests that high terrorist activities are more likely to contribute to high business failure, as 
countries would not be able to effectively resolve and mitigate against the insolvency of 
businesses.  
In order to test for hypothesis H1a, we disaggregate the analysis into developed, 
developing and fragile terror-prone countries. Evidence of the results of the fixed effect 
regressions is presented in Model 2, 3 and 4 of Table 5 for developed, developing and fragile 
terror-prone countries, respectively. The results in Table 5, Model 2, show that although 
terrorism and business failure are positively related, the relationship is not significant. 
Hypothesis H1a is therefore not confirmed.  Consistent with our expectations, the results in 
Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 show that terrorism is positive and significantly related to business 
failure in developing and fragile countries. This means that hypotheses H1b and H1c are 
confirmed. The fact that there is a significant and positive relationship between terrorism and 
business failure in developing and fragile countries, but not in developed countries, means 
that high terrorist activities are more likely to contribute to high business failure among 
businesses operating in developing and fragile terror-prone countries, which supports 
hypothesis H2.  
To gain further insights into the effect of terrorism on global business failure, we 
explored the marginal effects of terrorism in our sample of fragile countries, which we 
subdivided into SSA, South Asia and MENA countries. The results in Table 6 show that an 
increase in terrorist incidents by 100 will increase the chances of business failure by 0.7% 
and 1% points for SSA and South Asian countries, respectively. Surprisingly, the marginal 
effects of MENA countries were insignificant. Nevertheless, the larger marginal effect of 
South Asia was expected considering that the region contributes, overall, to a considerable 
share of terrorism.  
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[INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 The finding that terrorism has a significant impact on the business failure regarding 
the pooled countries is consistent with Kollias et al. (2011) who suggest that terrorism has 
multiple economic consequences that may be detrimental to the survival of the businesses. 
The positive effect of terrorism on business failure also follows the normative arguments that 
terrorist attacks increase the business costs (e.g., Brodeur 2017; Enderwick 2001) that may 
contribute to business failure, and in our study, this is shown through its impact on 
weakening the ability of countries to effectively manage insolvency issues. Therefore, our 
findings provide the evidence that supports the suggestion that terrorism can lead to business 
failure, because it results in a decline in the ability of countries to sustain an effective 
framework for resolving insolvency. 
 The findings that terrorism has a different impact when our sample is partitioned into 
developed, developing, and fragile countries are significant. For example, the finding that 
terrorism has no significant negative effect in developed countries follows the notion that 
developed countries have more resources than developing countries, which they use to 
minimise the disruption caused by terrorism and help businesses to recover (Sandler & 
Enders 2008). Arin et al. (2008), for example, find that the response to terror attacks varies 
across the developed and developing countries in that developed countries (UK, Spain) were 
less affected than the developing countries. The evidence of differences in the impact of 
terrorism on developed countries when compared to developing countries and fragile 
countries can also be explained in terms of the institutional voids that often exist in 
developing and fragile countries.  Developing countries – but particularly fragile countries – 
are often characterised by a sustained degradation of the preconditions that are relevant for 
the markets and for effective institutions to exist; which are governance structures, and the 
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rule of law, which in turn may weaken the sustainable macroeconomic frameworks used for 
managing the insolvency index, and thus, cause an increase in business failure. 
 On the control variables, GDP was negative and insignificant except for the 
developing country sample. Findings by Ahmad et al. (2009) also show that GDP reduces the 
corporate failure in their study. An increasing GDP indicates that businesses would, on 
average, record higher levels of profit, which has a propensity for lowering business failure. 
With respect to our findings, an increasing GDP would mean that countries are able pursue a 
regulatory macroeconomic framework that can help mitigate against insolvency issues. 
Savings was positive and significant in all the models. The positive relationship of this 
measure of financial development is not expected because financial development improves 
business survival through better and sustainable frameworks, which are used for managing 
insolvency. However, there could be several reasons for this. First, there is a possibility that 
the thresholds of savings in these regions are not at the required levels to allow for an 
effective reallocation of productive resources and the investment decisions necessary for an 
effective solvency framework. Second, savings could have been directed to other economic 
activities besides those of managing insolvency activities. Although, these lines of arguments 
were not being established in this study, as they were only theoretically used to lend support 
to the findings. Inflation was positive but only significant in the developing and fragile 
country samples. Inflation erodes macroeconomic frameworks and adds costs to the effective 
operations of governments. Lending rate was only positive and significant in the entire 
sample and developing country estimations. To some extent, this shows that increases in 
lending rates can lead to business failure. Increasing lending rates can also mean that the cost 
of capital is higher and debt recovery processes are less effective, leading to the liquidation of 
businesses. The availability of credit was negative and significant in all the models. The ease 
of capital access by businesses helps promote corporate investment and enables countries to 
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have frameworks that easily allow businesses to renegotiate their terms of credit, thereby, 
reducing the costs of financial distress (Djankov et al. 2005). This would mean that the 
insolvency issues are managed, and hence, there is a reduction in business failure.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
     This study presents an empirical investigation that is considering the impact of 
terrorism on business failure using a sample of 174 countries. To determine whether terrorism 
had different impacts on business failure we divided the sample into developing, developed 
and fragile countries. The results of the fixed estimations show that terrorism has a significant 
positive effect on business failure among the entire sample of 174 countries. However, when 
the sample is partitioned, the results indicate that terrorism has a significant positive impact 
on business failure in developing and fragile countries but not in developed countries. The 
marginal effects of the fragile states sample show that an increase in terrorist incidents by 100 
will increase business failure (insolvency index) by 1% and 0.7 % points in the South Asia 
and SSA regions, respectively.  
       The results of our study should be interpreted in the light of the limitations of the 
study. For example, due to data availability, our study is limited to a seven-year period. Also, 
despite the finding that terrorism is associated with business failure in the full sample, for 
both the developing and fragile countries, it is possible that there may be other explanatory 
variables not included. This is especially so in respect of the fragile countries where so many 
other variables can contribute to business failure. Finally, the impact of terrorism on business 
failure might be best captured at a sectorial level, as this will enable the characteristics of 
individual sectors to be modelled; however, due to data unavailability our study was unable 
to achieve this.  This could be an avenue for future research.  
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      Despite the limitations, our results contribute to the academic literature on terrorism 
and its impact on business failure and have policy implications. First, we offer new evidence 
of the relationship between terrorism and business failure using a global and more 
representative sample. The evidence suggests that, beyond losing life and personal injuries 
that the victims of terrorist actions suffer, and the atmosphere of fear that terrorists seek to 
create with their premeditated use of brutal violence, terror also has an adverse effect on the 
survival of businesses by weakening the macroeconomic frameworks, such as those that can 
help with managing insolvency issues. The results also contribute by providing new evidence 
that terrorism has a different impact in developed countries compared to developing countries 
and fragile states. In terms of the policy implications, our findings suggest that policy makers 
should be concerned about the economic consequences of terror attacks on macroeconomic 
and institutional frameworks, such as those related to managing the insolvencies of 
businesses no matter how small the terror attack is. We argue that such attacks impact on the 
business environment of countries and lead to business failure. Some channels through which 
this can occur may include the inability of economies to implement and sustain effective 
insolvency resolving laws and frameworks, the inability of business to have their insolvent 
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Sample Countries  
 
This table presents the sample of countries employed for our analysis on the impact of terrorism on global business failure 
over the period 2009-2015. + is for developed countries  
 
Afghanistan Comoros Hungary+ Mexico South Africa 
Albania  Congo Democratic Iceland+ Moldova South Sudan 
Algeria Congo Rep India Montenegro Spain+ 
Angola  Costa Rica Indonesia Morocco Sri Lanka 
Antigua and Barbuda Cote d'Ivoire Iran Mozambique St Lucia 
Argentina  Croatia+ Iraq Myanmar St. Kitts and Nevis 
Armenia  Cyprus+ Ireland+ Namibia Sudan 
Australia+ Czech Republic+ Israel+ Nepal Suriname 
Austria+ Denmark+ Italy+ Netherlands+ Swaziland 
Azerbaijan Djibouti Jamaica New Zealand+ Sweden+ 
Bahamas Dominica Japan+ Nicaragua Switzerland+ 
Bahrain  Dominican Republic Jordan Niger Syria 
Bangladesh Ecuador Kazakhstan Nigeria Tajikistan 
Barbados Egypt Kenya Norway+ Tanzania 
Belarus El Salvador Korea Rep+ Pakistan Thailand 
Belgium+ Equatorial Guinea Kosovo Panama Timor-Leste 
Belize Eritrea Kuwait Papua New Guinea Togo 
Benin Estonia+ Kyrgyz Republic Paraguay Trinidad and Tobago 
Bhutan Ethiopia Laos Peru Tunisia 
Bolivia  Fiji Latvia+ Philippines Turkey 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Finland+ Lebanon Poland+ UAE 
Botswana France+ Lesotho  Portugal+ Uganda 
Brazil  Gabon  Liberia Qatar Ukraine 
Brunei Darussalam Gambia  Libya Romania+ United Kingdom+ 
Bulgaria+ Georgia Lithuania+ Russian Federation United States+ 
Burkina Faso Germany+ Luxembourg+ Rwanda Uruguay 
Burundi Ghana Macedonia Saudi Arabia Uzbekistan 
Cambodia Greece+ Madagascar Senegal  Vanuatu 
Cameroon Grenada Malawi Serbia Venezuela 
Canada+ Guatemala Malaysia Seychelles Vietnam 
Central African Republic Guinea Maldives Sierra Leone West Bank 
Chad Guinea-Bissau Mali Singapore+ Yemen 
Chile+ Guyana Malta+ Slovak Republic+ Zambia 
China Haiti Mauritania Slovenia+ Zimbabwe 
Colombia Honduras  Mauritius Solomon Islands   
Country Classification is by the United Nations (2017). Classifications reflect and are based on economic country conditions 




















Sample Countries  
 
This table presents the sub-sample of countries employed for our analysis on the impact of terrorism on business failure in 
39 fragile countries over the period 2009-2015. * is for SSA countries, ** is for South Asian countries, *** is for MENA 




Afghanistan** Indonesia Philippines 
Algeria*** Iran*** Rwanda* 
Bangladesh** Iraq*** Senegal*  
Burundi* Kenya* Sri Lanka** 
Cameroon* Lebanon*** South Sudan* 
Central African Republic* Libya*** Sudan* 
Chad* Mali* Syria*** 
Colombia Mozambique* Thailand 
Congo Democratic* Myanmar Tunisia*** 
Cote d'Ivoire* Nepal** Turkey*** 
Egypt*** Niger* Uganda* 
Ethiopia* Nigeria* West Bank*** 
India** Pakistan** Yemen*** 
Source for Fragile Countries Ranking is the Fragile States Index (FSI, 2017). The rankings are based on a conflict 






Table 2 Variables definitions 
 
List of Variables  Definitions  
Dependent variables 
 Business Failure  This is a country-level measure of the percentage of businesses that are likely to fail. 
The measure is an adaptation of the World Bank Doing Business’ resolving 
insolvency index which measures the likelihood of businesses in a particular country 
of surviving.  
Independent variable 
 Terrorism This captures the number of terrorist incidents in a given year. Terrorism is defined 
as the planned use of threat of extra-normal violence by subnational groups to obtain 
a political, religious, or ideological objective through threats to a large audience, 
usually not directly involved with the decision making (GTD 2017; Ismail & Amjad 
2014).  
Control variables  
 GDP Measures the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in an economy 
(WDI 2017). 
 
 Savings ($US, Log) Measures the difference between GDP and total consumption (WDI 2017). 
  
Credit to Private Investors ($US, Log) This refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial 
corporations, such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade 
credits (WDI 2017). 
 
 Inflation Annual % change in the cost of consumer goods and services (WDI 2013). 
 
 Lending Rate (%) This refers to the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term financing 
needs of the private sector (WDI 2017). 
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Table 3A 
Descriptive Statistics (Global Sample) 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis. GDP, Savings, and Credit to Private Investors are in US$ billion. 
 
 
      All Countries        Developed  Developing 
      
  Countries’  Countries’  
  Mean 25th percentile 75th percentile  Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Mean 
Dependent Variable  
     
  
  Business Failure  56.318 45.280 71.360 22.558 0.140 99.950 30.799 65.221 
Independent Variable  
     
  
  Terrorism 53.024 0.000 5.000 248.636 0.000 3925.000 7.975 70.563 
Control Variables  
     
  
  GDP  410.000 9.200 219.000 1520.000 0.598 6200.000 1130.000 191.000 
Savings 119.000 -1.970 4260.000 444.000 -15.700 5350.000 238.000 84.000 
Inflation 4.995 -4.480 53.229 7.081 -8.283 109.681 1.629 5.876 
Lending Rate (%) 11.306 0.500 60.000 7.361 0.500 65.418 6.335 12.489 
Credit to Private Investors 514.000 0.079 28900.000 2680.000 0.036 34100.000 1700.000 179.000 
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Table 3B 
Descriptive Statistics (Fragile Countries) 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables employed in the analysis for the fragile countries. GDP, Savings, 
and Credit to Private Investors are in US$ billion. 
 
 
      Total       SSA South Asia MENA 
  Mean 25th percentile 75th percentile  Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Mean Mean 
Dependent Variable  
     
  
   Business Failure  66.539 57.650 74.420 14.612 22.320 96.610 71.141 64.313 65.886 
Independent Variable  
     
  
   Terrorism 217.578 0.000 2214.000 488.108 0.000 3925.000 43.190 571.500 311.971 
Control Variables  
     
  
   GDP 180.000 15.300 212.000 335.000 1.700 1860.000 45.570 377.660 197.017 
Savings 49.500 -3.970 599.000 111.000 -5.260 636.000 8.540 108.000 52.600 
Inflation 7.382 -2.248 39.266 8.226 -8.283 50.151 8.055 7.178 8.441 
Lending Rate (%) 12.751 5.679 28.447 7.117 5.526 65.418 15.511 11.790 11.315 
Credit to Private Investors 86.100 0.178 948.000 191.000 0.077 1090.000 7.190 177.000 102.000 
          
Sources: GTD (2017); WDI (2017). Summary statistics for SSA, South Asia and MENA countries are those of highly terror-prone and 







Table 4A  
Correlation Matrix (Global Sample) 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Business Failure 1.000 
      2 Terrorism 0.074 1.000 
     3 GDP 0.248 0.014 1.000 
    4 Savings -0.463 0.150 -0.066 1.000 
   5 Inflation 0.306 0.042 -0.073 -0.077 1.000 
  6 Lending Rate (%) 0.461 0.032 0.064 -0.270 0.338 1.000 





Table 4B  
Correlation Matrix (Fragile Countries) 
 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Business Failure  1.000       
2 Terrorism -0.039 1.000 
     3 GDP 0.037 -0.020 1.000 
    4 Savings -0.329 0.356 0.011 1.000 
   5 Inflation 0.140 -0.070 -0.269 0.031 1.000 
  6 Lending Rate (%) 0.220 -0.009 0.019 -0.231 0.196 1.000 
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Table 5  
Fixed-effects (country and year effects) Estimations.   
 
This table presents the regression results of the estimations for the entire sample and sub-samples. t statistics are in 




Dependent Variable  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  
Business Failure  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  All countries Developed countries Developing countries Fragile countries 
Independent Variables  
    Terrorism 0.014*** 0.054 0.006** 0.010*** 
 
(6.920) (1.100) (2.790) (5.020) 
Control Variables  
    GDP -2.590*** -4.944*** -0.603 -4.033*** 
 
(-7.260) (-25.760) (-1.710) (-6.880) 
Savings ($US, Log) 0.168*** 0.479*** 0.068** 0.221** 
 
(6.760) (3.360) (3.070) (3.300) 
Inflation 0.101 -0.613 0.130** 0.383** 
 
(1.580) (-1.670) (3.360) (2.980) 
Lending Rate (%) 0.755*** 0.441 0.456 -0.225 
 
(9.400) (0.950) (8.630) (-0.850) 
Credit to Private Investors ($US, Log) -0.177*** -0.085** -0.095*** -0.133*** 
 
(-6.660) (-2.550) (-17.427) (-4.390) 
Cons. 6.456 122.000** -39.130*** 24.120 
 
(0.980) (3.210) (-4.370) (1.520) 
R Squared 0.4537 0.2701 0.6350 0.7738 
Number of Observation  762 225 537 146 
Note: Number of observations vary due to missing data of some of the dependent and control variables. Values in table have 





Table 6 Estimations of the Marginal Effects (Fragile Countries)  
 
This table presents the regression results of the marginal effects of the fragile countries. t statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significance at the 10% Level; **Significance at the 5% Level; ***Significance at the 1% Level. 
 
Dependent Variable  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  Fixed-effects  
 Business Failure  SSA South Asian MENA 
 
Countries Countries  Countries  
 
Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  Marginal Effects  
  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Independent Variable  
   Terrorism 0.007*** 0.010** -0.002 
 
(5.230) (2.500) (-0.290) 
     
Values in table have been approximated to 3 decimal places.   
 
